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Bathtub Conspiracies: A Doctrinal
Cleansing is Needed
MICHAEL H. DESSENT*
A Brief Assessment of the Problem
The specific language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act1 provides
in relevant part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States ... is hereby declared to bp
illegal." Various court interpretations 2 of factual situations in-
volving alleged violations of the "conspiracy" provision of this
section have expanded the traditional definition of conspiracy to
include various surprising relationships among so-called intracor-
* Associate Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. B.S.,
1964; J.D., 1967, Northwestern University. Member, California Bar.
The author wishes to express special appreciation to Alan S. Rabino-
witz for his outstanding legal work on all parts of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238
U.S. 635 (1915); questioned in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,
Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947); Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967), rev'd in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1003.
June 1972 Vol. 9 No. 4
porate parties as conspirators.3 Intracorporate conspiracy is af-
fectionately known as the "bathtub conspiracy" doctrine and has
created a viable field for legal scholarship on its soundness and
feasibility. 4
There are two underlying reasons for this development. One
is based on the potential success or lack thereof of enforcing
antitrust violations. Under Section 2, the monopoly provision of
the Sherman Act,5 a prerequisite for criminal violation is intent,
if one can believe the Justice Department that size alone is not
enough.0 If monopoly power is not provable under Section 2, the
courts have held that the fact of conspiracy is enough to impose
antitrust liability under Section 1, and neither actual restraint
nor overt act need be proved.7 It must be qualified that this
3. Another unusual interpretation of the "conspiracy" concept of § 1 is
found in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. et al v. International Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134 (1968). Perma Life presents a new dimension to the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The Supreme Court, in essence,
held that a "coerced plaintiff to an illegal antitrust activity could,
along with the defendant, constitute the joint parties for conspiracy pur-
poses under Section 1." This immediately raises the problem of who is
a coerced plaintiff. The court per Justice Black, in its pursuit to attach
liability under Section 1, initially rejected the application of the doctrine
of in par delicto to treble damage actions. The court indicated the in-
appropriateness of creating broad common law barriers to relief where a
private suit serves important public purposes. The court went on to say
that a more fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties
would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the private
action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement.
Apparently, the only restriction on the plaintiff's recovery would be that
any possible beneficial by-product to him could be taken into consideration
in computing damages. In other words, comparative negligence might
be used as a partial test. The court even concluded that the plaintiffs in
the alleged illegal activity were far from voluntary participants. That
is, although the dealers sought the Midas franchises enthusiastically, they
did not actively seek each and every clause of the agreement, but accepted
the contract as a whole in order to obtain an otherwise attractive business
opportunity.
4. Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies: Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent
Brew? 24 Bus. LAW. 173 (1968); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences
of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 20 (1968); McQuade,
Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises and Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
63 YALE L. REv. 393 (1954); Comment, Antitrust Law-Conspiracies-
Unincorporated Divisions of a Single Corporation Held Capable of Con-
spiring Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 172 (1968).
5. Section 2 provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor...
6. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
7. See de Vires v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764, 349 P.2d
532 (1960), where it is stated that there is a clear distinction in the law of
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would only apply to a prosecution for criminal conspiracy, while
in civil conspiracy under Section 1, damages must be shown to
have resulted from an overt act done pursuant to a common
design.8
Another theory, and probably more basic, is that the activity
involved really is anticompetitive and the parties participating in
such activity should be held accountable. As stated in United
States v. General Motors Corp.: 9
The theory in back of the Sherman law is to protect free move-
ment of goods in interstate commerce against unreasonable re-
straints, to assure open interstate markets where traders may
freely negotiate sales and to preserve normal competitive forces
which otherwise might operate in these markets.' 0
From the inception of the Sherman Act the courts have given
it a broad scope in apparent pursuit of this objective. In 1911,
the United States Supreme Court reviewed the history of the
language employed by Congress and concluded in its landmark
Standard Oil case1 that Section 1 is "an all-embracing enumera-
tion to make sure that no form of contract or combination by
which an undue restraint of interstate commerce is achieved can
be saved from condemnation."
12
Although these rationales may be commendable as idealistic
objectives of any capitalistic society, the ultimate question is wheth-
conspiracy as applied to criminal as differentiated from civil cases. The
gist of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement to commit the unlawful
act, while the gist of the tort is the damage resulting to the plaintiff from
an overt act or acts done pursuant to the common design; Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 27 N.J. Super. 404, 99 A.2d 548 (1953), where it is stated that in
criminal conspiracy, "[t]he agreement or conspiracy was the gravamen
of the offense . . .in civil actions, the conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the charge, but may be both pleaded and proved as aggravating the
wrong of which the plaintiff complains." The essence of the (civil) ac-
tion, it seems, is not-the conspiracy but the damages done to the plaintiff;
see also McGrath v. Keenan, 24 N.J. Misc. 121, 46 A.2d 725 (1946), and
Smith v. Christopherson, 267 Wis. 150, 64 N.W.2d 744 (1954).
8. Supra note 7; Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50,
35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963); Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d
47 (10th Cir. 1963).
9. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) [hereinafter cited as General Motors].
10. Id. at 403.
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910) [hereinafter
cited as Standard Oil].
12. Id. at 59-60.
er or not the "bathtub conspiracy" theory is a sound legal prin-
ciple as an antitrust precept?
In order to assess this question, one must understand the mean-
ing of conspiracy, as stated in the Sherman Act. The traditional
criminal definition of a "conspiracy" is "a combination of two or
more persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means."'13 How-
ever, the process of going from allegation of conspiracy to proof
is complex and confusing to the bench as well as the bar. In
order to determine the existence or non-existence of the conspir-
acy, one must examine "questions of fact" to be determined from
all of the circumstances in evidence.14 To meet this burden of
proof in civil conspiracy, the elements usually encompass: (1)
formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful act or
acts pursuant thereto, and (3) resulting damage. 15 Criminal con-
spiracy, as discussed earlier, requires just the showing of the
conspiracy per se.16
Applying those definitions and the proof requirements set out
above to the antitrust field forces one to confront a continuum
where, at one end, independent companies operating together for
purposes of restraining trade would be obvious violators, assum-
ing the proof was satisfactory. At the other end of the continuum
would be the single enterprise which supposedly would not be
liable under the definitions. There is also a middle ground repre-
sented by the multicorporate organization which may or may not
be liable depending on one's conception of conspiracy.' 7 These
last two examples have brought forth the courts' apparent ex-
tension of Section 1, which has precipitated the "bathtub con-
spiracy" and more recently the "coerced" plaintiff doctrines.
13. R. PERKs, PERxnws ON CannxmAL LAW 613 (1969). Spaulding v.
Evenson, 149 F. 913, 923 (C.C. Wash. 1906); United States v. Hutcheson,
32 F. Supp. 600, 602 (E.D. Mo. 1940).
14. See Gary Theatre Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corporation, 120 F.2d
891, 894 (7th Cir. 1941), where it is stated:
Obviously it is not necessary in order to establish a conspiracy,
to have direct evidence of a formal contract. Determination of
existence or non-existence of conspiracy involves questions offact to be determined from all the circumstances in evidence.
15. Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1963).
16. Supra note 7, although the essential elements are the same as in a
civil conspiracy. See text at 870 supra. See Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F.Supp. 44, 56 (E.D. Mich. 1955); United States v. American Precision
Products Corp., 115 F. Supp. 823, 826 (D. N.J. 1953).
17. See McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises and Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183 (1955).
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The tracing of the "bathtub conspiracy" probably begins with
the Sixth Circuit in 1915 in Patterson v. United States, 8 where
the court bluntly held that Section l's reference to combinations
and conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce includes con-
spiracies between competitors, or between the officers and agents
of one competitor on its behalf, against another competitor.19 The
court emphasized the competition requirement by stating that the
officers must have such connection with the company that in the
performance of their duties they had to work with their compe-
tition.
The case seemed to assume that Section 1 covers conspiracies
among officers of the same company without any real empirical
justification 20 and went from there to the proof problems, noting
that through their practices the officers had allegedly acquired
95 percent of the relevant product market.21
Refinements on the Early Doctrine
The holding of Patterson, although never specifically overruled,
was rejected by later circuits beginning with Nelson Radio &
Supply Co. v. Motorola Inc. 22 There the conspiracy alleged was
among the defendant corporation, its president, sales manager,
officers, employees, representatives, and agents. The court stated
that:
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two
persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot
conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and it
is a general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the
corporation.23
The court cited the district court opinion which had stated:
... the inclusion of the defendant's agents in the alleged con-
18. 222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915) [hereinafter cited as Patterson]. See
also White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600
(8th Cir. 1942) holding same result where single movie exhibitor and
officers conspired to violate Section 1 and Section 2.
19. 222 F. at 618-19.
20. Id. No discussion of view holding officers as parties to conspiracy
under aegis of corporation in terms of requirements of Section 1.
21. Id. at 623.
22. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Nelson Radio].
23. Id. at 914.
spiracy would seem to be only the basis for a technical rather
than a substantial charge of conspiracy because obviously the
agents were acting only for the defendant corporation. 24
The Fifth Circuit added that in the absence of any allegation to
indicate that the agents of the corporation were acting in other
than their normal capacities, the plaintiff failed to state a cause
of action based on conspiracy under Section 1 of the Act.25 The
court also indicated that the activities undertaken by the defend-
ants involved no more than day-to-day managerial decisions con-
cerning the price at which the corporation would sell its goods,
the quantity it would produce, the type of customers or market
to be served or the quality of goods to be produced, and this type
of activity would not violate Section 1 as an unlawful restraint of
trade.2
Although this doctrine has been followed in subsequent cases
dealing with corporate officers and employees 27 and attempts have
even been made to extend its principle,28 the case did not close
the door to potential intracorporate liability on other theories.
In fact, the court in Nelson indicated that if a corporation con-
spired with its subsidiary it could be liable under Section 1 since
a subsidiary was a separate legal entity, thereby reaffirming earlier
decisions. 29
The case first enunciating conspiracy based on activities of a
corporation and its subsidiaries was the General Motors30 crim-
inal decision of the Seventh Circuit. The conspiracy alleged was
24. Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, 26 F. Supp. 824, 830
(D. Md. 1937).
25. 200 F.2d at 914.
26. Id.
27. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962);
Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47, 52 (10th Cir. 1963);
Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103, 105 (W.D.
Tex. 1962); Shasta Douglas Oil Co. v. Work, 212 Cal. App. 2d 618, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 190 (1963); Bliss v. Southern Pacific Co., 212 Ore. 634, 321 P.2d
324 (1958).
28. In Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103,
105 (W.D. Tex. 1962), plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that the
defendant, Ford Motor Company, through its officers, agents, employees or
representatives, and through corporations, franchises, or divisions thereof
over which defendant exercised control engaged in a conspiracy to sell a
large number of Lincoln automobiles in Texas in the latter part of 1957
and the first months of 1958. The court cited Nelson Radio at 105 as to
officers and corporation conspiring, thereby disposing of this part of the
complaint without discussion of the second allegation of the corporation
and its subsidiaries, franchises, or divisions as possible parties for con-
spiracy purposes.
29. 200 F.2d at 914.
30. 121 F.2d at 376.
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between General Motors and three of its wholly-owned subsidi-
aries: GMSC (General Motors Sales), GMAC (Financing Divi-
sion), and GMAC of Indiana, for conspiring against GM dealers
to force them to finance their purchases from GM and sales to
consumers through GMAC. In upholding the conviction, the court
stated that as a matter of law the appellants were separate entities,
even though, as a matter of economics, they may have consti-
tuted a single integrated enterprise, and that they were not im-
potent to restrain trade and commerce of the dealers in General
Motors cars.3 ' While the evidence showed that the four corpora-
tions had interlocking directorates and the functions of each were
mutually complementary, the court in part substantiated its sep-
arate entity theory by noting that the manufacturing, selling and
finance activities operated on a highly decentralized scheme, giv-
ing autonomy to each of the subsidiaries.3 2 The court also stated:
: * .nor can appellants enjoy the benefits of separate corporate
identity and escape the consequences of illegal combination in
restraint of trade by insisting that they do not affect a single
trader.33
One thing of interest is that the court did hedge a bit on this
principle when it said that ". . . even if the single trader doctrine
were applicable it would not help appellants,"34 since liability
could have been predicated on Section 3 of the Clayton Act as a
tying case.
On the one hand, the decision announced that a corporation and
its subsidiary could conspire and thereby violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, but the court seemed unsure of its reasoning as
evidenced by its justifications for the rule.
Later Applications of the Doctrine
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,35 the Supreme Court went
one step further than General Motors by holding that a restraint
of trade may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who
are "affiliated" or "integrated" under common ownership as from
31. Id. at 410.
32. Id. at 386, 404.
33. Id. at 404.
34. Id.
35. 332 U.S. 218 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Yellow Cab].
a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent.8" The
case involved the plan of a controlling shareholder of a manufac-
turing corporation to merge that small company with his more
important cab companies in other cities. In pursuit of this ob-
jective, the manufacturing corporation set up new operating corp-
orations to control the existing businesses. As a consequence of
these acts, it was alleged that the companies obtained a monopoly
of, for example, as much as 100 percent of the relevant market
in Pittsburgh.
While standing for the proposition that a coroporation and its
affiliates may constitute the necessary plurality of actors for Sec-
tion 1 purposes, Yellow Cab seems to qualify this broad statement.
First, the point that the companies were formed for anti-competi-
tive purposes seems of significance in the court's finding. Using
language from United States v. Reading Co.,37 the court stated
that the theory of the complaint was that the "dominating power"
over the cab operating companies
• . . was not obtained by normal expansion to meet the demands
of a business growing as a result of superior and enterprising
management, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control. 88
Concluding that section, the court said that if that theory were
borne out on retrial by the evidence coupled with proof of an undue
restraint of interstate trade, a plain violation of the act had oc-
curred.
3 9
In other words, the actors needed for the conspiracy were found
in the creation of the organizations; the subsequent agreements
established the plan after affiliation.4 0  Thereby, arguably it can
be said that in the process of forming the operating companies,
the existing companies still retained their former existence as
independents and could conspire as such.
A later case, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons.,41 fol-
lowed the precedent established by Yellow Cab in holding that
wholly-owned subsidiaries of a parent corporation could constitute
the necessary joint parties for the conspiracy requirement of Sec-
tion 1.42 In that case, the conspiracy involved an agreement by
36. Id. at 227.
37. 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
38. Id. at 57.
39. 332 U.S. at 228.
40. Id. at 227-234.
41. 340 U.S. 211 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Kiefer].
42. Id. at 71. Note this case is distinguishable from General Motors
because that case dealt with an alleged conspiracy between a corporation
and a subsidiary.
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Seagram and Calvert corporations, two subsidiaries of the Seagram
corporate family, to sell liquor to only those wholesalers who
would resell at prices fixed by Seagram and Calvert. The court
rejected the ". . . mere instrumentalities of a single manufactur-
ing-merchandising unit.. .,,4 argument citing Yellow Cab. This
case again can be limited to its facts, however, as the court hedged
its decision by stating that the Sherman Act is ".... especially ap-
plicable where, as here, respondents [subsidiaries] hold them-
selves out as competitors."44  This might have been a strong
factor indicating to the court the independent character of the
subsidiaries in conjunction with their legal separateness.
In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,45 the court
again reaffirmed Yellow Cab and Kiefer.46 The alleged violation
involved Timken Corporation conspiring with one British and one
French corporation, in each of which it had a financial interest,
to restrain interstate and foreign commerce in the manufacture
and sale of antifriction bearings.47 The agreements allegedly had
allocated trade territories, fixed prices on products of one sold in
the territory of the others, cooperated to protect each other's
markets, eliminated outside competition, and participated in car-
tels to restrict imports to, and exports from, the United States.48
In upholding the conviction found by the District Court, the court
reiterated Kiefer and stated that:
... the fact that there is common ownership or control of the
contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact
of the antitrust laws.49
There is an interesting aside to this case. Although American
Timken had interests in the British and French companies, theirs
was not an exclusive ownership. Their ownership consisted of 30
percent of the stock in the British company and co-ownership
with another party in French Timken.G Since a subsidiary is
generally defined as a company, the stock in which another com-
43. Id. at 215.
44. Id.
45. 341 U.S. 593 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Timken].
46. 332 U.S. 218 (1947); 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
47. 341 U.S. at 595.
48. Id. at 595-96.
49. Id. at 598.
50. Id. at 595.
pany has at least a majority interest and thus has control,51
this raises the question of whether the case does fit in with the
Kiefer and Yellow Cab approach. It could be argued that these
agreements were between clearly independent companies with no
intracorporate connection. This conclusion is further supported
by the fact that the majority of the court never used the term
"subsidiaries."5 2
New Extensions of Prior Reasoning
In 1967, Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons,53 temporarily extended the "bathtub conspiracy" doctrine
as far as it could go.54
There, the district court held that divisions within a corporation
could conspire for purpose of Section 1 liability.5  In this suit
Hawaiian Oke and Liquors Ltd. brought an action to recover treble
damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act" for injury allegedly
resulting from defendants' attempt to put it out of business. The
court's prime consideration was directed to the requested instruc-
tion that Seagram's three unincorporated divisions: Calvert, Four
Roses, and Frankfort,5 7 be treated as separate entities for purposes
of meeting the conspiracy provision of Section 1. The court, in
51. W srTE's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTioNARY (1966); 341 U.S.
593 (1951).
52. It is to be noted that Justice Jackson in his dissent, at 606-607, sug-
gests that the majority of the court is terming British and French Timken
as subsidiaries of American Timken. See United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948); and Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110(1948) whereby the United States charged that motion picture exhibitors
owning extensive chains of movie theatres had violated Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court in each case utilized the intra-
corporate conspiracy doctrine; but see McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate
Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183, 195-202
(1955) for a discussion of analogous reasoning holding several of the
named defendants as independent parties for conspiracy purposes under
Section 1.
53. 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967) [hereinafter cited as Hawaiian
Oke].
54. It is to be noted that in Kiefer, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), where the court
had held the wholly owned subsidiaries of Seagrams liable to conspiracy
charges under Section 1 (see pp. 875-76), Seagrams had reorganized itself
denying itself the tax and corporate benefits of operating through sub-
sidiaries, thereby hoping to take itself out of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
55. 272 F. Supp. at 918-20.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
57. Calvert Distillers Company, a division of House of Seagram; Four
Roses Distillers Company, a division of House of Seagram; Frankfort
Distillers Company, a division of House of Seagram.
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sustaining this request, concluded that having made the divisions
separate and independent for this particular economic function
(separate sales and distribution organizations), the defendants
could not then escape the legal impact of their action.58
The reasoning of the court in this case is unique and far-
reaching. First, it relies on Standard Oil in concluding that Sec-
tion 1 was intended to have broad application.59 Second, the
court distinguishes the case from contrary results6" by emphasiz-
ing the horizontal aspects of the alleged conspiracy as distin-
guished from the more usual vertical combinations. 61
Finally, while the court accepts the fact that the divisions were
not independent from Seagram in many aspects,6 2 it asserts that
the crucial question of separateness for Section 1 purposes is
whether
each facet of the unincorporated division's operation is, in fact,
for all purposes, controlled and directed above, or is it em-
bodied with separable, self-generated, and moving power to act
in the pertinent area of economic activity.63
If the latter, the court goes on, then it is a separate business entity
under the antitrust laws. Since the violation consisted of the
termination of Hawaiian Oke as a sales representative, this criteria
clearly was met.64
Thus, in the Hawaii District Court, at least, if divisions of a
corporation are acting independent of each other in a specific
economic activity, and in pursuit of this activity they agree to
engage in conduct which would violate the antitrust laws, they
are liable as conspirators under Section 1. This case could open
the door for a finding that any internal units (e.g., departments
or branches) within a corporation are conspirators if they fall
within the framework of the decision.65
58. 272 F. Supp. at 924.
59. Supra note 11 & 12.
60. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Deterjet Corp. v. United
Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962); Kemwel Automotive Corp.
v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960).
61. 272 F. Supp. at 918-19.
62. Id. at 924.
63. Id. at 920.
64. Id. at 924.
65. The applicable question is, "[i]s each facet of the unincorporated
While the doctrine announced in the District Court's opinion
still has the potential to expand into other courts, Hawaiian Oke
was reversed on appeal by the 9th Circuit in 1969.00 The Circuit
Court rejected the lower court's theory of unincorporated divisions
as constituting joint parties for conspiracy purposes under Section
1.67 It accepted the Yellow Cab and Kiefer holdings, but classified
the Hawaiian Oke case into the Nelson's Radio mode of reasoning.0 8
The Circuit Court also rejected the lower court's argument that
the change from the Kiefer arrangement to the present one was
one of form with no corresponding change in marketing tech-
nique.69
The crucial holding, from an antitrust viewpoint, is that the
Circuit Court looked at the total control situation between the
corporation and its unincorporated division, consequently rejecting
the test enunciated by the District Court.70
The court also dismissed the distinction made by the District
Court between horizontal and vertical conspiracies in saying that
this was also an elevation of form over substance.7
division's operation in fact controlled, and directed above, or is it endowed
with separable, self-generated and moving power to act in the pertinent
area of economic activity?" Id. at 920. It could likewise be extended to
other internal units of the corporation-i.e., branches and employee-
distributors.
66. 416 F.2d 71.
67. Id. at 84.
68. Id. at 82-83.
69. Id. at 83, where the circuit court states:
There is here no evidence that the "de-incorporation" of the former
corporations was a sham of "shuffling of papers" as plaintiff ar-
gues. Nor do we think that there was here a mere chance in the
label attached to a business entity. Before the 1959 reorganiza-
tion, each subsidiary had its own payroll, accounting department
billing, and each had limited liability. Consolidation destroyed
this limited liability, as well as certain tax advantages. The trialjudge relied only on the fact that the divisions had autonomous
sales organizations, thus in effect conceding that there was no
autonomy in other respects. But since sales and price decisions
are not made in a vacuum, but are affected by other corporate
activities, we doubt that autonomy in sales alone would ever be
sufficient independence.
70. Id. at 83-84.
71. Id. at 84, where the Circuit Court stated:
Nor is it an answer to say, as the trial judge did, that here the
conspiracy was "horizontal," [supra notes 60 & 61]. This is an ele-
vation of form over substance. If intracorporate divisions are
capable of conspiracy only on a horizontal plane, they could avoid
the antitrust laws and still conspire by going through somone
higher up in the corporation hierarchy. We do not see why the
House of Seagram could order Calvert, Four Roses, and
Frankfort to change their lines from plaintiff to McResson, but
Calvert, Four Roses, and Frankfort cannot themselves agree to
do so.
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Finally, the court cited the potential danger of intra-corporate
conspiracy to the organizational existence of corporations, saying:
once the theory that 'divisions' or other internal administra-
tive units of a single entity can conspire with each other is ac-
cepted, we can see no sensible basis upon which it can be decided
that, in one case, there has been a conspiracy and that, in another,
there has not."2
The court emphasized the economic necessity of internal units
within a large corporation, stating that it is most unlikely that
partially autonomous divisions of a single corporate enterprise will
or can operate completely independent of each other. It is inevi-
table that there will be communication between them, either di-
rectly or through those persons in the corporate hierarchy to
whom they report. Such communication can then be used as evi-
dence that they arrive at understandings with each other as to
what they would do. Thus, they are capable of conspiring be-
cause they are autonomous, and they have conspired because they
are, in fact and law, parts of a single corporation."
However, while the circuit court's opinion would accord more
with the definition of conspiracy, the test of the District Court
is still available.
While Hawaiian Oke represents the most recent court decision
on intracorporate conspiracy, it is arguable that the Supreme
Court in 1968 extended the reasoning of the doctrine outside of
"pure" corporate units in the Perma Life74 case. The case is not
totally revolutionary since the framework for the court's decision
previously had been established,75 but it is the latest announcement
expanding the potential of the conspiracy of Section 1.
The action was brought by certain dealers who had operated
"Midas Muffler Shops" under sales agreements with respondent,
Midas, Inc. Their complaint charged that Midas had entered into
a conspiracy with the other named defendants-its parent corpora-
tion International Parts Corporation, two other subsidiaries, and
six individual defendants who were their officers or agents to
restrain and substantially lessen competition in violation of Sec-
72. Id. at 83.
73. Id. at 84.
74. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Perma Life].
75. See 340 U.S. 211.
tion I of the Sherman Act and Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.76 The plaintiff chal-
lenged the legality of their sales agreements which imposed vari-
ous restrictions on the dealers utilizing the "Midas" name. Relying
on Timken and Yellow Cab,7 7 the court said in relevant part:
But since respondents Midas and International availed themselves
of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations,
the fact of common ownership could not save them from any of
the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities. 8
The court could have stopped there and found the necessary
plurality of actors for conspiracy purposes, but it went on to say: 70
In any event each petitioner can clearly charge a combination
between Midas and himself as of the day he unwillingly complied
with the restrictive franchise agreements,80 or between Midas
and other franchise dealers whose acquiescence in Midas' firmly
enforced restraints was induced by the communicated danger of
termination.8 1
This was not purely dicta, but to the contrary, the court held
that although this allegation of conspiracy was not even pleaded
by petitioners, the gist of this new theory was clearly demon-
strated and there was no prejudice to respondents. This was
based on the rationale that pleadings should "... be so construed
as to do substantial justice. 8 2
One is then presented with the picture of a dealer suing a dis-
tributor for antitrust violations with the two of them constituting
the joint parties for purposes of the conspiracy provision of Section
1. This holding is based on the rationale that the dealer, although
a part of the alleged illegal action, was coerced into it by fear of
losing an otherwise attractive business activity. 83 The court also
states that to bar them would defeat the purposes of the private
action, to wit: deter anyone contemplating business behavior in
violation of the antitrust laws. 4 Thus, the dealer has the best of
76. 392 U.S. at 135; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964); 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
77. 341 U.S. 593 (1951); 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
78. 392 U.S. at 141-42.
79. Id. at 142.
80. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 (1968), rehearing denied
390 U.S. 1018 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
81. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
82. 392 U.S. at 142 (1968). See Rule 8(f), FED. RULES Civ. PRoc.
83. 392 U.S. at 139-41. The question really is whether the dealers were
coerced as that word is commonly understood. The Court itself states
that the dealers sought the franchises enthusiastically, but that many
clauses were detrimental to them but accepted to obtain an otherwise
attractive business opportunity.
84. Id. at 138-39.
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both worlds. If he makes it as a dealer, he is happy; if he loses
or is fired, he may get treble damages from his business partner.
It is apparent that while this is not a purely intracorporate
situation, there is a strong analogy to it. There exists a business
relationship going beyond normal arm's-length sales transactions.
In order to obtain the Midas franchise, the dealers were under the
continuing control of Midas and International, to the extent that
they had to conform to the Midas mode of operating in order to
purchase their products from Midas. These dealers therefore,
while independent in the legal sense were far from economically
independent. While they were not subsidiaries or even divisions
in the pure sense, they arguably could be termed outlets or
branches of the main corporation."s The doctrine announced in
this case could open the treble damages door for anybody having
any dealings with a corporation where there is any modicum of
control by one over the other, thereby making it part of a Section
1 conspiracy.
Attacks Upon the Doctrine
While serving as Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department, Donald Turner stated:
We should not, for example, attempt to push the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine as far as a free-wheeling interpretation of
the Timken case might suggest.86
This statement of policy has not been followed to its fullest extent
by all jurisdictions.8 7  However, it necessarily implies the ques-
tion of why one should curtail the intracorporate conspiracy doc-
trine, when its ultimate purpose is to prevent anticompetitive
conduct.
85. Id. at 136-37.
86. Turner, Address Before the American Bar Association, 10 ANTITRUST
BULL. 685, 687 (1965).
87. See Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). It is interesting to note that the trend
could be away from the doctrine as evidenced by the 9th Circuit opin-
ion in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71 (1969). Willis and Pitofsky indicate in their article Antitrust
Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 30-35(1968) that Federal enforcement policy, lower Federal courts, and con-
gressional policy have resisted the "bathtub conspiracy doctrine."
Criticisms of the doctrine 8  revolve around the potential deter-
ring effect it may have on the decision making functions of corpo-
rations 9 and more fundamentally, on the soundness of the doctrine
itself in terms of the traditional concept of conspiracy.00
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine can be divided for pur-
poses of analysis into the following classifications: (1) a corpora-
tion and its officers and directors, (2) a corporation and its sub-
sidiaries, (3) a corporation and its affiliates and (4) a corporation
and its divisions or other internal units. Each category will be
analyzed with a view toward its historic validity and current
efficacy.
A Corporation and Its Officers and Directors
A corporation can only act through its officers and agents.
However, the courts have uniformly rejected the doctrine that a
corporation and its officers or agents constitute the necessary
plurality of actors for conspiracy purposes under Section 1.91
These cases are based on the rationale that a corporation cannot
conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and it
is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the
corporation.92 The basis for this rejection is that if there is no
independence (whether or not as a legal entity) between the al-
leged conspirators except for their titles, then the corporation has
sufficient control over its actors for a court to consider them as
agents of the corporation.9 3
If such a conspiracy were sustained, it would be found to exist
between a corporation and itself. It is arguable that this reasoning
88. Supra note 4.
89. See text at 888-89.
90. See text at 872. It is interesting to note that in Section 8 of the
Sherman Act it is stated:
That the word "person" or "persons", whenever used in this Act
shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing
under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws
of any foreign country.
It is arguable that Section 1 should be interpreted in light of this concep-
tion of what "person" means, thereby omitting subsidiaries, divisions, af-
filiates, and other internal units of corporation from the impact of the
Act.
91. 200 F.2d 911.
92. Id. at 914; see also Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d
50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963) holding that an alleged conspiracy between
a corporation and employee does not meet the definitional requirement of
two parties, in the torts field.
93. An agent is defined as one who acts for or in the place of another by
authority from him-BLAcK'S LAw DicTioNARY 85 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
[VOL. 9: 869, 1972] Bathtub Conspiracies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
could be extended to a rejection of any possible conspiracy between
a corporation and its affiliates. While the analogy has not been
discussed in any definitive way by the courts, possibly because
they feel that there is no basis for holding an affiliate as an
agent, Nelson Radio and those following do give credence to such
a comparison.
A Corporation and Its Subsidiaries
The strongest situation for applying the bathtub conspiracy in-
volves an alleged conspiracy between a corporation and its sub-
sidiaries.94 A subsidiary is recognized by law as a separate entity
from its parent corporation.95 This multicorporate form has nu-
merous advantages, particularly flexibility in management, re-
ducing taxes, spreading risks, adjusting debts and earnings to
correspond with the needs within the enterprise and acquiring
new capital.90
The court in General Motors held that one accepting the bene-
fits of separate existence must also accept the burdens that go
along with it if it violates the antitrust laws97 If the subsidiary
is in fact independent from the parent, this broad rule would
present no problems.98 However, the present majority rule is
formalistic in application and does not take into account the actual
relationship between the parent and its subsidiaries on a case
by case determination. 9 This approach seems questionable for
obtaining the two parties needed for a conspiracy and, predictably,
has been criticized.100
94. United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.
1941).
95. See generally, H. HENN., HANDBOOK oF THE LAw or CoRPOPATIoNs,
§ 149 (1970).
96. See Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate
Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 20, 26 (1968).
97. Supra note 33.
98. Independence is defined as the state or condition of being free from
dependence, subjection, or control-BLAcK's LAW DicTIoxARY 911 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968). It is also interesting to note the alter ego concept where the cor-
porate veil is broken if the subsidiary is a mere tool of the parent corpora-
tion. A similar reasoning is applicable in vicarious liability situations.
99. In 121 F.2d at 404, it is stated "nor can the appellants enjoy the
benefits of separate corporate entity and escape the consequences of an
illegal combination in restraint of trade by insisting that they are in
effect a single trader."
100. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 96.
A more certain indicia for ascertaining if there are, in reality,
two parties for Section 1 purposes is the control relationship be-
tween the parties on which the suit is based. If the subsidiary
is operating within an independent sphere it is capable of meeting
the conspiracy requirement, but if it is merely a tool or agent of
the corporation then its actions are those of the parent corporation.
Thus it would not constitute an additional party to meet the
conspiracy requirements. 1 1
Furthermore, even if it can be argued that a subsidiary is inde-
pendent of its parent corporation, thereby along with its parent
constituting the necessary plurality of actors for conspiracy pur-
poses, it is questionable whether there is concerted action by
agreement between the two entities. In other words, while form-
ally there are two parties, in economic substance the subsidiary
may be so dependent on the parent corporation that it is incapable
of agreeing or "conspiring" as contemplated by the Act.10"
A case using this approach is Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler
& Smith Citrus Products Co., 10 3 in which the Supreme Court held
that three agricultural cooperatives were not independent parties
to meet the requisite plurality of actors for Section 1 purposes.
Relying on the Clayton'104 and Capper-Volstead Acts,105 the court
concluded that these cooperatives were one "organization" or "asso-
ciation" even though they had formally organized themselves into
three separate legal entities. 100 The court also stated that there
was no indication that the use of separate corporations had eco-
nomic significance in itself or that outsiders considered and dealt
with the three entities as independent organizations.or In effect
there really was no cooperation; just a decision and proposed
course of action by the parent to which the subsidiaries had no
choice but to acquiese.
When determining whether or not a Section 1 violation exists,
one should also ascertain whether the alleged conspiracy involves
a restraint of trade by hindering outside competition. 08 A purely
101. See 200F.2d 911.
102. See Forcione, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Antitrust Reg-
ulations of the Common Market, 25 Bus. LAW. 1419 (1970).
103. 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
105. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1964).
106. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.,
370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962).
107. Id. at 29.
108. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part, "[every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states is hereby to be
declared illegal."
[VOL. 9: 869, 1972] Bathtub Conspiracies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
internal agreement by a parent and its subsidiary, regardless of
the plurality of actors requirement, would not constitute a viola-
tion of Section 1.109
In Kiefer,110 the court held that wholly-owned subsidiaries of
a corporation were capable of constituting the necessary joint
actors for the conspiracy requirement of Section 1.111 The court
did indicate that since the subsidiaries held themselves out as
competitors, the Sherman Act was especially applicable.112 How-
ever, it is possible to interpret this remark as a secondary con-
sideration with the court's primary emphasis being on the legal
separateness of the subsidiaries.113 Such an analysis would follow
the formalistic approaches of General Motors"1 4 and Yellow Cab,115
but again its emphasis is misplaced if one wants to comport with
the legal definition of conspiracy. 116
The control relationship between the subsidiaries should be the
prime test in order to ascertain if the subsidiaries are truly inde-
pendent from each other. Furthermore, their relationship to the
parent corporation would be relevant so as to indicate if they
were treated as subsidiaries "in fact" or as part of a single business
unit, thereby not able to be classified as separate parties, regard-
less of their legal autonomy.
A Corporation and Its Affiliates
The allegation of a conspiracy between a corporation and its
affiliates involves a different business concept from those dis-
cussed previously. While a subsidiary is legally independent
of its parent, an affiliate, in business parlance, is a company
109. See United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. % 69,
619 (N.D. Okla. 1960); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 319 F.2d
683 (2d Cir. 1963).
110. 340 U.S. 211.
111. Id. at 215.
112. Id.
113. This because the Court states that common ownership and control
does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws and
then makes reference to the fact that the rule is especially applicable,
where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as competitors. Id.
114. 121 F.2d 376.
115. 332 U.S. 218.
116. Conspiracy is defined as requiring two parties-R. PERMINs, PERKINs
ON CRIM NAL LAw 613 (1969).
effectively controlled by association with others under common
ownership. 1 1 7  Since a conspiracy by definition requires two or
more "persons,"' 1 8 the question then arises whether or not an
affiliate is capable of constituting a necessary part to a conspiracy.
Yellow Cab" 9 would indicate that it can do so. The court stated:
The fact that these restraints occur in a setting described by the
appellees as a vertically integrated enterprise does not necessar-
ily remove the ban of the Sherman Act. The test of illegality
under the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable
restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as
readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or inte-
grated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among
those who are otherwise independent. Similarly, any affiliation
or integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate
the conspirators from the sanctions which Congress has imposed.
The corporate interrelationships of the conspirators, in other
words, are not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman
Act. That statute is aimed at substance rather than form.120
While the case can be limited to its facts,12 the potential of the
statement readily could be extended. The case holds that the
restraint provision of Section 1 is the crucial indicator. If this
element is found to exist, a harsh interpretation of the case would
assert that the parties to it may constitute the necessary plurality
of actors, regardless of the actual relation of control between
them. This reasoning seems to disregard the specific conspiracy
requirement contained in Section 1. Its formalistic reasoning, how
ever, does follow other cases announced by the Court. 22 A better
interpretation would combine this rationale with an analysis of
economic independence to reach the desired result.
One possible underlying rationale for holding affiliates as inde-
pendent parties for conspiracy purposes is suggested by the rule
announced by the district court in the recent Hawaiian Oke 23
case. If the affiliates are functioning in separate activities from
the overall operation of the enterprise, they would be independent
to the extent of those activities. However, utilizing this approach
disregards the total control situation of the parties. 24 More im-
117. It is important to note the definitional distinction between an affili-
ate and subsidiary, as this distinction is particularly important in analyz-
ing the "bathtub conspiracy"; see BLAci's LAw DicTioNAnY (rev. 4th ed.
1968); WEBsTER's Tnn NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966).
118. PEHKINS, supra note 116.
119. 332 U.S. 218.
120. Id. at 227.
121. See text at 876-77.
122. Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
123. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967).
124. Id. at 920, 924.
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portant, it puts aside the fact that the affiliates comprise a part
of a single business unit under common ownership. Therefore,
holding them as parties for conspiracy purposes is really holding
the entire business unit as conspiring with itself.125 Such a con-
clusion, again, ignores the overall view of both restraint of trade
and economic independence.
A Corporation and Its Divisions or Other Internal Units
The Hawaiian Oke case 126 presents some interesting views on this
subject. The decision reached by the district court extended the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine about as far as it could go.' 27
The subsequent reversal by the Court of Appeals128 illustrates
the proper approach to be used when facing allegations of intra-
corporate conspiracy. The circuit court looked at the actual re-
lationship between the parties in terms of control to ascertain if
there were "in fact" two independent parties as required by
Section 1.129 While this approach is contrary to the usual formal-
istic approach the courts have utilized, 30 it eliminates the distinct
possibility of an extension of intracorporate conspiracies to a corpo-
ration and its internal units, such as departments or branches.' 31
The control approach sanction by the circuit court in Hawaiian
Oke takes notice of the meaning of conspiracy under Section 1.
There must be two parties in reality and not just because different
titles are assigned to units of the corporation to differentiate
activities within its overall operation. Finally, the reversal recog-
nizes the policy warning of Donald Turner a few years ago.
RECOMMENDATIONS AmD CoNcLusIONs
Future efficacy of the "bathtub conspiracy"
The traditional approach for ascertaining the feasibility of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under Section 1 as a viable
125. 200 F.2d 911.
126. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
277 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967) rev'd Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
127. See text at 887-88.
128. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
129. 416 F.2d at 83-84.
130. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 96.
131. Supra note 65.
antitrust remedy has ignored the legally accepted definition of
conspiracy.
Instead, in the evolution of the doctrine, the majority of courts
have emphasized only the alleged anticompetitive activity and
public policy of Section 1. The consequence of this approach has
been to subordinate and occasionally ignore the required defini-
tional elements of a conspiracy.
The effect of the decisions has been to place the entire organiza-
tional structure of corporations into question in the antitrust
field. A corporation today is not certain whether autonomous
units within its structure will be held liable as conspirators under
Section 1 if the activity affects competition however indirect.
However, this trend has not been without exceptions. The re-
cent 9th Circuit decision in the Hawaiian Oke case reveals that
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is not all-embracing. On
the contrary, that holding marks a point from which other courts
might depart, heeding, thereby the legal meaning of conspiracy.
This guideline involves examining the total relationship between
the alleged conspirators in terms of the control which one holds
over the other. Conspiracy requires two parties and concerted
action between them. This means that the parties are economi-
cally independent of each other in their cooperating activity. A
subsidiary, affiliate or division which is controlled in its course
of activity by a parent corporation should not be considered to be
an independent party capable of conspiring with that parent.
If so, such a relationship belies the concept of arms-length con-
certed action between the alleged conspirators.
For those internal corporate units conspiring between them-
selves the same test should be applicable. However, the test
would involve a two-fold problem. First, the relationship between
the units would be of utmost importance in terms of their actual
independence or dependence upon each other. Furthermore, their
relationship to the parent corporation would be of significance for
indicating their de facto Or de jure separateness from each other.
In other words, if the parent controlled the units in terms of a
single activity, regardless of their-separate titles, they should not
be classified as separate parties.1
32
132. The situation presented by Perma Life is susceptible to the same
type of reasoning. The crucial question still revolves around whether the
alleged plaintiff was really coerced so as to void his agreement. The con-
trol test would be used in a reverse manner from the traditional bathtub
discussion. Here, if the plaintiff were truly forced into signing by the
defendant corporation, this would illustrate that it was not a voluntary,
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The reasoning of most courts dealing with the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine illustrates the impropriety of the use of the
doctrine in terms of generally accepted concepts of conspiracy.
Unfortunately, that approach sets no ascertainable standard as to
its limit, but rather leaves the intracorporate door wide open.
knowing participant dealing at arm's length. Therefore, as a participant
making no voluntary consent to the agreement, the plaintiff should not
be held along with the defendant as the two parties necessary for con-
spiracy purposes.
